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Our comments on the proposed rule changes are based on research at the Center for Integration of
Science and Industry at Bentley University aimed at accelerating the translation of scientific discoveries
for public value.1 We make two arguments:
1. Proposed rule changes regarding limitations of march-in rights are inconsistent with
government authority to consider pricing of products that benefit from “subject inventions” in
the public interest and the objectives of Bayh-Dole.
2. The proposed rule changes limit mechanisms to provide taxpayers with a return on their
investment in federally funded R&D.

Ensuring taxpayers reap the benefits of federally funded research and receive a
return on their investment in this research
The Executive Summary to the December 2018 “Green Paper” Return on Investment Initiative for
Unleashing American Innovation2 states: “The U.S. innovation system is substantially fueled by the
discoveries and inventions arising from federally funded R&D at the Nation’s universities, research
institutes, and Federal Laboratories.” The report further states that a focus of the initiative is to
“…increase the taxpayers return on their investment in federally funded R&D.” (emphasis in original)
Our work recognizes the critical role played by the public sector as an “investor of first resort” in
stimulating innovation and economic growth,3 as well as the central role played by the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980 in operationalizing the transfer of federally funded inventions to industry for commercialization.
We endorse the initiative’s recognition that public sector investments play a central role in stimulating
innovation and the imperative of providing the public with a return on investment commensurate with
the risk of these early-stage investments. In these comments, we argue that the proposed rulemaking
errs in weakening the already limited mechanisms by which the Bayh-Dole Act intends to advance the
public interest and provide taxpayers with a return on their investment.
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Proposed rule changes regarding limitations of march-in rights are inconsistent
with government authority to consider pricing of products that benefit from
“subject inventions” in the public interest and the objectives of Bayh-Dole
The Green Paper incorrectly states that march-in rights in the Bayh-Dole Act are triggered solely by
“commercialization” (or non-commercialization) of the subject invention.4 The Bayh-Dole Act clearly
states that march-in rights involve steps to “…achieve practical application of the subject invention…” or
“…alleviate health or safety needs that are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their
licensees.”5 In the Act, the term “practical applications” requires “…that its benefits are, to the extent
permitted by law or government regulations, available to the public on reasonable terms.”6
This definition of “practical application” is central to the design of the Bayh-Dole Act, which gives federal
agencies the right to “revoke or modify” the rights of the contractor (recipient of federal funding) to
retain or license the rights to subject inventions “...to the extent necessary to achieve expeditious
practical application of the subject invention…” 7 For example, if a licensee fails to proceed with
commercialization, then there is no question that march-in rights would be appropriate to facilitate a
third parties’ practical application of the invention. Moreover, if a licensee were to seek pricing making a
product unaffordable to a segment of society in the United States (i.e. a specific socioeconomic class),
that too should be considered failure to achieve practical application.
Since the late 1880s, judicial opinion has held that the reasonableness of business prices is subject to
government regulation in the public interest. As summarized by the Congressional Research Service,8 an
extensive body of case law has developed around whether this authority was restricted to businesses
“affected with a public interest.” This case law recognized that government authority included the
authority to require reasonable pricing, taking into account methods for valuation, and that price
regulations not be confiscatory or materially damage the business involved. While the proposed rules do
not pertain to price controls per se, several precedents are relevant:
1. It should be noted that “public interest” was recognized to apply not only to utilities, but also
railroads, grain elevators, stockyards, and fire insurance companies among others which provide
critical needs and services to functioning society. This approach was supplanted to some extent in
the 1930s when the Supreme Court accepted the plenary power of the Federal Government to
exercise regulatory power based on the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution, making the
public interest rationale less central to Federal regulation. That said, modern pharmaceutical
companies, which not only provide products essential for public health, but benefit from
government-granted and regulated monopoly over the sale of new pharmaceutical products,
certainly meet the standard of providing for public interest, and conditioning licenses on this
obligation is well within the authority of the Federal Government.9
Many respondents have detailed the profoundly detrimental effects that excessive drug prices can
have on the public interest, and we will not repeat those arguments here. We believe the operative
question is not simply whether current drug prices are contrary to the public interest, but rather if
it is possible to conceive of drug prices being contrary to the public interest, for example, pricing
practices that were discriminatory, anticompetitive, or inconsistent with the national interests of the
U.S. (i.e., preferentially lower to other countries). As march-in rights are one of the few remedies
available to the public under the Bayh-Dole Act, consideration of pricing as a potential trigger for the
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march-in provisions is appropriate. Legal precedent is clear that consideration of price in protecting
the public’s interest in “...practical application of the subject invention…” under “reasonable terms”
to “…alleviate health or safety needs” is an appropriate exercise of government power.
2. Courts have ruled that there is no single formula or method for determining a reasonable price, but
that pricing “…involves balancing of the investor and consumer interests….”10 This standard
recognizes the imperative of considering both the public interest and the ability of companies to
successfully commercialize products enabled by federally funded research in assessing the
reasonableness of drug prices and the exercise of march-in rights.
3. Finally, legal precedent holds that reasonable prices should allow companies to achieve returns
“…commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks…” and
“…sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital.” This is consistent with the overarching objective of Bayh-Dole, namely
to promote commercialization of products based on federally funded research.
In this context, the proposed rule that would prohibit consideration of price in the march-in rights
associated with the Bayh-Dole Act11 is inconsistent with government authority to consider prices in
the public interest and the objectives of Bayh-Dole. Legal precedent, as well as the clear language of
the Act requiring “practical applications” to be “available under reasonable terms” provides balanced
protections for both the licensee, who invests in commercializing the product, and the consumer, for
whom the product may be essential for treating or preventing death or disability.

The proposed rule changes limit mechanisms to provide taxpayers with a return
on their investment in federally funded R&D.
Our research has focused on understanding the scale of the public sector (government) investments in
biomedical research that enable new drug development, and also the mechanisms for providing the
public with an appropriate return on investment commensurate with the risk of early-stage
contributions to innovation. Specifically, we have shown that:
1. The scale of the federal investment in research enabling new drug approvals is much greater than
generally appreciated. Specifically, we have shown that the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
invested >$187 billion for basic or applied research related to the new drugs approved from 20102019.12 Significantly, NIH funding contributed to research related to every drug approved over this
period, with >80% being basic research on the biological targets rather than research on the drug
itself.
2. A mature body of basic research is requisite for drug approvals. Based on research showing that
the maturation of the technology incorporated in a product is a critical determinant of product
success, we developed a model for assessing the maturation of science underlying new drug
approvals. We have shown that few, if any, targeted drugs are approved before the underlying
research is established, and that the clinical development timelines are significantly shorter when
the products enter clinical trials after this point.13
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3. A very small fraction of federally funded research is captured by economically significant patents.
Our work shows that only 9.4% of new drugs approved from 2010-2019 had a federally funded
patent related to the drug or its biological target listed in DrugPatentWatch, a database of patents
linked to market exclusivity.14 These patents arose from 0.34% of the total NIH investment in
research related to these products, including 0.83% of (applied) research on the drug and 0.09% of
(basic) research related to the biological target.15 These results are consistent with the fact that
federal funding for biomedical research focuses on the basic science that enables drug discovery,
rather than development itself. Basic research is less likely to meet the utility and enablement
standards of an invention and, thus, less likely to generate a “subject invention” triggering BayhDole.
4. Academic institutions receive significantly lower royalties and payments than for-profit firms from
biotechnology licenses. Our work shows that academic institutions receive lower royalties (2.5-3.5%
versus $4.3-5.7%) and precommercial payment ($0,1-2.0M versus $7.8-10.3M) than for-profit firms.
This disparity is not accounted for by differences in the clinical stage of the licensed product,
licensee (biotech vs. large pharma) or license terms including exclusivity, R&D funding, equity, or codevelopment.16 The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) reports that, from
1996-2017, universities received $35 billion in total licensing income, including $24.8 billion in
royalties, across all technology sectors. This represents the total direct return to the public sector.
Over the same period, AUTM (working with the Biotechnology Industry Organization) estimates the
indirect economic impact of university licensing to be $723 billion–$1.7 trillion in gross industry output
or $374–$865 billion in GDP.17 It should be noted that these estimates are not based on the value new
products provide to consumers, but rather the price paid by consumers (taxpayers) for these products.
Moreover, while the jobs embodied in this growth were generated by technology-driven innovation, the
salaries are paid from the sales of these products. Specifically, the return on investment is not the gross
value of the products or jobs enabled by federally funded research, but rather the net value of these
products after considering the price paid by consumers. Thus, the public return on investment is only a
fraction of this total economic impact. In this context, high prices on pharmaceutical products reduces
the public’s return on investment. Conversely, public policy that assures a reasonable price could
provide an increased return.
Bayh-Dole also posits that taxpayers receive a return on investment by stimulating US-based economic
activity, jobs, and taxes. Since the passage of Bayh-Dole in 1980, the emergence of Milton Friedman’s
doctrine of maximizing shareholder value has subordinated industry’s traditional focus on consumers to
that of shareholders, who have gained unprecedented power over corporate priorities and profits. The
result has been that companies increasingly offshore jobs, revenues, and taxes and use stock-based
strategies to extract value from corporations. 18 This increasing financialization of industry diminishes
the return to taxpayers anticipated by the Bayh-Dole Act.
We are aware that many of the comments regarding this proposed rule change will argue that the
potential for using march-in rights to reduce drug prices is a threat to innovation. There is limited
objective evidence to support such claims.19 In a recent study, we showed that from 2000-2018 the 35
largest companies reported $11.5 trillion of sales with gross profits of $1.9 trillion, distributed $1.7
trillion to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock buybacks, and funded $1.7 trillion in R&D while
achieving a net income significantly higher than other large public companies.20 In this context, it seems
4

unjustifiable to argue that the existing Bayh-Dole regulations, which include the implied threat of
using federal march-in rights for failure to commercialize products under reasonable terms (including
price), represents an ongoing disincentive for innovation.
Finally, we note that the proposed, Trump-era changes to Bayh-Dole posit a distinct constitutional vision
for the role of government in providing for the public interest. In a recent article, Mila Sohoni wrote that
many of the Trump administration’s initiatives “…renovate the Lochner-era Court’s commitment to
protecting liberty of contract from state encroachment,”21 invoking a 1905 court decision that stands in
contradistinction to the reforms of the New Deal that made the public interest central to the role of
government. This comparison illustrates the essential error of the proposed rule changes. In 2019, the
US government spent >$1.4 trillion on Medicare and Medicaid, and federal healthcare expenditures
accounted for 29% of all health expenditures, with state and local governments accounting for another
16%. The government, itself, is the largest payer for healthcare and the greatest stakeholder in
reasonable drug pricing and has a shared interest in having the products that result from “subject
inventions” available under reasonable terms. In this context, it is fiscally irresponsible to prohibit
consideration of price as a factor in policies designed to promote and protect the interests of
taxpayers.
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